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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
property, it is difficult to see how a right thereto may be a vested property
right. It is even more difficult so to characterize a mere right of nomination
to a public office. A. B. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION-RETROSPECTIvE ABROGATION OF Ex-
EMPTIONS-[United States].-Plaintiff paid under protest an income tax
imposed under a Wisconsin act of 1935 upon corporate dividends earned by
plaintiff in 1933 from corporations whose principal business was "attribu-
table to Wisconsin." This class of income had been exempt from such tax-
ation under the Wisconsin Act of 1933.1 In a suit to recover back the sum
paid as illegally assessed, held, that the Wisconsin Act of 1935 did not in-
fringe the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2
The theory that retrospective tax laws necessarily violate the Federal
Constitution has been definitely exploded.5 Numerous valid retrospective
revisions of the federal and state revenue laws have imposed taxes on sub-
jects previously untaxed or have shifted the burden of old taxes by changes
in rates, exemptions, and deductions. The permissive basis for such legis-
lative action is the fact that taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the
taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of
apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are
privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. No citizen enjoys
immunity from that burden.4
In each particular case, however, it is necessary to consider the nature
of the tax and the circumstances under which it is presented before it can
be said whether the tax levied exceeds the limits of permissible retroactiv-
ity.5 The testse applied in determining the validity of a particular retro-
1. "If 50% or more of the total net income of the corporation paying
them was included in the computation of the Wisconsin tax on corporate
income," such corporate dividends were exempt from any income tax under
the Act of 1933.
2. Welch v. Henry (1938) 59 S. Ct. 121, Roberts, Butler, and McReynolds,
JJ., dissenting.
3. This theory was advanced in Lowenhaupt, The Power of Congress to
Impose Excise Taxes Retroactively (1936) 21 ST. Louis LAW REvmw 109,
where it is said at p. 119: "No one contradicts that a law is tyrannical
which imposes a penalty upon an act which, when the act was done, one
was at liberty to do without any liability." The authorities cited infra,
notes 4-10, and the instant case leave no doubt as to the unsoundness of
this position.
4. Welch v. Henry (1938) 59 S. Ct. 121, 125; Nichols v. Coolidge (1927)
274 U. S. 531; Untermeyer v. Anderson (1928) 276 U. S. 440; Phillip
Wagner, Inc. v. Leser (1915) 239 U. S. 207; Seattle v. Kelleher (1904)
195 U. S. 351.
5. For an excellent presentation of this problem, see Neuhoff, Retrospec-
tive Tax Laws (1935) 21 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW 1, containing a factual
presentation of the leading cases on this subject.
6. Neuhoff, supra, note 5, at 11, noting that a few cases seem not to
conform to these tests and suggesting that this may be due to the fact that
these tests as applied in a particular case "leave considerable room for inter-
pretation" to the judges.
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spective tax law under the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution
are (1) whether the nature or amount of the tax could reasonably have'
been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular voluntary
act which the statute later made the taxable event;7 (2) whether the retro-
spective application is harsh and oppressive;8 (3) whether the tax attempt.%
to reach events so far in the past as to render that objection valid;9 and (4)
whether the emergency for levying the tax was so great that as a matter
of social policy the tax was justifiable. 10
The majority opinion in the instant case held that the present tax might.
"approach or reach the limit of permissible retroactivity,"11 but that it.
did not exceed it.12 The court further held that the equal protection clause,
does not preclude retrospective changes in tax laws if the new taxes could
have been included in the earlier act when adopted. The Wisconsin Act of
1935 was held valid in this respect since the income taxed thereby could,
have been taxed when earned in 1933.13 The dissenting justices, however,
disagreed with this rule and determined invalidity under the equal protec-
tion clause on the same basis as under the due process clauses.1'
A similar tax law in Missouri would be invalid, because the Constitu-
tion of Missouri specifically provides that no law "retrospective in its oper-
ation" can be passed by the General Assembly.15
S. R. S.
7. See cases cited supra, note 4. The majority opinion in the principaF
case holds the tax valid on this basis. The dissenting justices declare the,
tax invalid as being unforeseeable. 59 S. Ct. at 130. See also Mlliken v.
United States (1931) 283 U. S. 15; Stockdale v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1874)
20 Wall. 323; Saltonstall v. Saltonstall (1928) 276 U. S. 260; Chase Nat.
Bank v. United States (1929) 278 U. S. 327.
8. The majority opinion held the tax not to be oppressive. 59 S. Ct. at
126. At p. 128, the dissenting justices said, "This class was subjected to
an unusually inequitable burden." See also United States v. Hudson (1937)
299 U. S. 498; Coolidge v. Long (1931) 282 U. S. 582; Untermeyer v.
Anderson (1928) 276 U. S. 440; Blodgett v. Holden (1927) 275 U. S. 142.
9. United States v. Hudson (1937) 299 U. S. 498; Cooper v. United
States (1930) 280 U. S. 409, 411. On this point the Court again divided
in the principal case, the dissenting opinion declaring that too long a period
had elapsed between the voluntary act and the subsequent tax thereon.
59 S. Ct. at 127.
10. This factor is a new element in determining the validity of retro-
activity. The Wisconsin Act of 1935 expressly declared that the levy was
an emergency tax to provide revenue for unemployment relief purposes.
The dissenting justices doubted the validity of this test but went on to
state that even if it were a factor, the emergency of unemployment relief
was not of sufficient social significance to warrant the levying of a retro-
spective tax. 59 S. Ct. at 128.
11. Welch v. Henry (1938) 59 S. Ct. 121, 127.
12. See authorities cited supra, notes 6-10.
13. Welch v. Henry (1938) 59 S. Ct. 121, 124-125.
14. Id. at 130.
15. Mo.' Const. art. II, sec. 15; Smith v. Dirckx (1920) 283 Mo. 188, 223
S. W. 104.
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